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Abstract. Fault detection and isolation are very important elements in the design of fault-
tolerant decision support systems for ship operator guidance. This study outlines remedies that
can be applied for fault diagnosis, when the ship responses are assumed to be linear in the wave
excitation. A novel numerical procedure is described for the calculation of residuals using the
ship's transfer functions which correlate the wave excitation and the ship responses. As tests,
multiplicative faults have articially been imposed to full-scale motion measurements and it is
shown that the developed model is able to detect and isolate all faults.
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1. Introduction
Today, onboard monitoring and decision support systems are installed on many commercial and
navy vessels. In the present context, 'decision support' relates to operator guidance for the ship's
master with respect to deciding on course and speed to keep wave-induced responses (motions,
accelerations, etc.) below an acceptable limit. Typically, several responses are monitored by mea-
surements from a system of sensors that could be as indicated in Figure 1. The decision support
system (DSS) is conceptually based on a principle which involves hydrodynamical and mathematical
models in combination with information about the sea state (see sub-section 1.2). The overall idea
is sketched in Figure 2, where 'Output' is guidance in terms of predicted responses. The predicted
responses apply to given operational conditions, including speed and course, and will facilitate an
evaluation of risks associated to the considered conditions. In the end, this should lead to future
response measurements below acceptable limits.
Decision support systems should be applied only when the quality of associated sensors and software
is tested, securing the whole integrated system to be generally well-working, Nielsen et al. [23]. On
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Figure 7    SeaSense Sensors 
Figure 1. Example of sensor arrangement on a ship.
the other hand, it can never be avoided that sensors, or their corresponding signals, at some stage,
are likely to be corrupted by faults. It is therefore vital to be able to automatically detect any faults
that may occur in a decision support system during operation, so that information/warnings can
be issued about unreliable results. As a direct extension to 'fault detection' comes a wish to make a
decision support system fault-tolerant. This means that the system has the ability to react on the
existence of fault(s) by adjusting its activities to the faulty behaviour of the system. Fault-tolerant
decision support systems for ship operator guidance are not standard, and little work has been done
so far in the area. However, recently research has been initiated, e.g. Lajic [15], Lajic and Nielsen
[17], Lajic et al. [16, 18], and it is foreseen that many improvements in this area will be made in
the future.
Past 
measurements
Output:
guidance
Future 
measurements
DSS:
Mat. model
+
wave estimation
Figure 2. Guidance is provided from a mathematical model and statistics of past
measurements can be used to supplement shipboard wave estimations in the mathe-
matical model. Nielsen and Jensen [22].
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The present article summarises important ndings made in a recent Ph.D. work, Lajic [15], on fault-
tolerant monitoring and decision support systems. Specically, work was carried out to improve the
reliability and dependability of decision support systems applied for matters of ship safety. This
included the development of algorithms incorporating fault diagnosis techniques and improving the
multi-sensor data fusion taking place in most monitoring and decision support systems.
1.1. Literature. Although the introduction of fault diagnosis techniques is new within the scope of
decision support systems for ship safety, there is an existing literature on fault-tolerant approaches
and algorithms for control of general ship components (engine, propulsion system, rudder, etc.) and
particular responses. The present work has its foundation in some of this literature which includes:
Three papers by Blanke [3, 4, 6] in which fault diagnosis and fault-tolerant control approaches are
advocated for as means to enhance maritime and navigational safety. In Blanke et al. [7] the re-
conguration possibilities for a ship propulsion system with a main engine and a controllable pitch
propeller have been analysed and it has been demonstrated how fault tolerance could be achieved
against a critical sensor failure. Similarly, sensor fault-tolerant control for a ship propulsion system
is presented in Wu et al. [31], and implementation of the onboard control and monitoring system for
unmanned underwater vehicles has been presented in Tiano et al. [30]. Furthermore, applications
have been presented for early detection of parametric roll by Galeazzi et al. [10, 11].
1.2. Sea state estimation. A delicate and crucially fundamental part of decision support sys-
tems is the part which concerns the onboard estimation of the sea state at the advancing ship's
Figure 3. The fundamental idea in the estimation of wave spectra based on mea-
sured ship responses.
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exact position in the ocean. Thus, the combined use of the estimated sea state and mathema-
tical/hydrodynamical models of the ship's behaviour to waves makes it possible to (statistically)
predict about the future responses of the ship expected in, say, a 30 minutes horizon. Basically,
two approaches exist for onboard sea state estimation: (1) the wave buoy analogy, which processes
measured ship responses to give an estimate of the wave environment, and (2) wave radar sys-
tems. The use of satellite data is not yet a feasible approach for onboard wave measurements,
although in the future this could change. The present work relies on the wave buoy analogy
[12, 20, 21, 24, 27, 26, 29] where the fundamental input is a set of response measurements (mo-
tions, accelerations, strains, etc.). In this way, the way buoy analogy utilises onboard response
measurements that are often carried out irrespectively on many of today's naval and commercial
vessels. Consequently, the wave buoy analogy is a relatively inexpensive estimation concept, since
the system development is associated with software only [24]. The wave buoy analogy as such will
not be considered herein but a graphical illustration of the procedure is given in Figure 3 [1] and
detailed information can be found in the given references.
1.3. Objectives. The overall objective of this work is to improve the reliability and dependability
of decision support systems for ship operator guidance with respect to wave-induced responses. In
general, the following techniques are suggested to improve the overall reliability and dependability
of onboard systems:
 Fault diagnosis - means to detect the presence of faults in the system. Faulty signal(s)
should be discarded from the procedure for sea state estimation if it is possible, if not the
fault should be estimated. When the sea state estimation is conducted by the wave buoy
analogy, e.g. [20, 21], it is sucient to use three dierent ship responses and usually the
responses of more sensors are available.
 Sensor fusion quality test - means to decide which three ship responses would be the most
suitable combination for wave spectrum estimation. The sensor fusion quality test should
be applied to each combination of three non-faulty signals.
It is noteworthy that this article deals with the rst item - Fault diagnosis - only. This choice
is made for matters of space limitations and since the sensor fusion quality test still needs to be
elaborated on.
In the original work by Lajic [15] two models for fault diagnosis are discussed: the time domain
model based on ship kinematics, and the frequency domain model based on linear spectral analysis.
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By use of linear spectral analysis, it is possible to dene equations which correlate dierent ship
responses through transfer functions. With the frequency domain model, all faults can be isolated
and their magnitudes can be estimated. On the other hand, using the time domain model inde-
pendently, all the faults can be detected, but not isolated. This means that additional techniques
should be employed, like active fault detection or direct evaluation of Gaussian zero-mean ship
responses by the GLR (Generalized Likelihood Ratio) test. In this article, focus will therefore be
on the frequency domain model only. It should be noted that the frequency domain model, using
transfer functions for calculating the residuals, is a new numerical procedure for fault diagnosis.
1.4. Composition of article. The article has been divided into six main sections. The next
section, Section 2, briey describes the main principles of fault-tolerant onboard decision support
systems and the basics of fault diagnosis will be introduced. Moreover, the frequency domain
(system) model will be derived. Section 3 introduces system analysis and elaborates on the system
model by application of structural analysis (of the system structure). The goal of the section is
to derive the residuals, which are the primary target for fault detection and isolation. Reliable
change detection algorithm is a fundamental element for fault detection and some basics of change
detectors are given in Section 4. In Section 5, full-scale data is considered and it is shown that fault
detection and isolation can be achieved by the developed model. Finally, conclusions are made in
Section 6 which also recommends future work.
2. fault-tolerant monitoring and decision support systems
Although the following section is written with a focus on monitoring and decision support systems
the terminology is relaxed, so that only systems will be mentioned (except for the last sub-section).
In this regards, one of several denitions of a 'system' should be kept in mind, Miller [19]: "A
system is a set of interacting units with relationship among them". The section introduces some
standard terms and general principles for fault diagnosis, which relies highly on Blanke et al. [8].
At the end of the section, a documentation will be given of the specic system model which will be
analysed later with respect to full-scale measurements.
2.1. System behaviour. A fault is something that changes the system behaviour, so that the
system no longer serves its purpose. The fault is the primary cause of system performance degra-
dation or even loss of the system function. Therefore, it is very important to nd the fault(s) as
quickly as possible and to make decisions that stop the propagation of their eects. The aim of
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Figure 4. System beaviour; B0 is a faultless case whereas Bf is a faulty case.
these measures is to make the system fault-tolerant meaning that the system is still functioning
after the appearance of a fault. A fault-tolerant system has the ability to react on the existence
of the fault by adjusting its activities to the faulty behaviour of the system. The procedure for
making a system fault-tolerant consists of two steps, cf. Blanke et al. [8]:
(1) Fault diagnosis: The existence of faults has to be detected and the faults have to be
identied.
(2) Re-design: The system has to be adapted to the faulty situation so that the overall system
continues to satisfy its goal.
A system with an input u(t) and an output y(t) both depending on time t is now considered. The
pair (u; y) is called input/output (I/O) pair, and the set of all possible pairs that may occur for
a given system denes the behaviour B. The behaviour B can be dened as a subset of the space
u  y of all possible combinations of I/O signals. In Figure 4 a graphical interpretation of the
system behaviour is given. From the gure two particular system behaviours B0 (faultless) and
Bf (faulty) are considered. The point A represents an I/O pair that may occur for the faultless
system, while the point B represents a pair which is inconsistent with the system dynamics. This
means that the point B corresponds to an I/O pair inuenced by a fault.
In general, any fault changes the system behaviour. Thus, the consequence of a fault is that the
system behaviour moves from the set B0 towards the set Bf . In the case of a common input u,
the two systems - faultless and faulty - will give dierent outputs yA and yB , respectively. The
change in the system behaviour makes the detection and isolation of a fault possible. However, the
measurement information (u; y) alone is not sucient, but a dynamical model, which describes the
nominal system behaviour, is necessary.
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The system model describes the behaviour of the faultless and the faulty system which means that
the model restricts the possible I/O pairs to those that appear in the behaviour B0 or Bf . In other
words, the model is a set of constraints on the signals u and y in the system. In fault diagnosis
both the input u and the output y will be known and it is checked whether the I/O pair belongs
to the specic behaviour.
2.2. The diagnostic principle. If a specic I/O pair (U; Y ) is represented by a point A, cf. Figure
4, then for a faultless system (and a correct system model) A lies in the set B0. On the contrary,
a dierent output bY is generated from U if the system is faulty. The particular fault is said to be
detectable if the I/O pair (U; bY ) lies outside B0. However, if the produced I/O pair corresponds to
point B, cf. Figure 4, the faulty system leads to no inconsistency and the fault is not detected. This
consideration leads to the foundation of the diagnostic principle which is concerned with testing
whether or not any measurement (U; Y ) is consistent with the system behaviour. Thus, any I/O
pair should be checked with respect to the nominal system behaviour and, in case of a fault, the
fault is detected if (U; Y ) =2 B0. However, if the I/O pair lies in Bf for a system subject to a fault
f , the fault may occur. Hence, f is denoted a fault candidate. The diagnostic result is usually a
set Fc  F of fault candidates.
In summary, the diagnostic principle is based on the following test:
Consistency-based diagnosis - For given models that describe the behaviour Bf of
the system subject to the faults f 2 F , test whether the I/O pair (U; Y ) satises the
relation
(U,Y) 2 Bf
From the test, two outcomes are considered:
 Fault detection - If the I/O pair is inconsistent with the behaviour B0 of the faultless
system, (U; Y ) =2 B0, then a fault is know to have occurred.
 Fault isolation and identication - If the input/output pair is consistent with the
behaviour Bf , that is, (U; Y ) 2 Bf , then the fault may have occurred.
On the basis of the diagnostic principle and its consequences it should be noted that fault detection
is possible without any information about the behaviour of the faulty system. Fault detection algo-
rithms use only a model of the nominal system. It is sucient to identify deviations of the current
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system behaviour from the nominal behaviour. On the other hand, fault isolation and identica-
tion are not possible without information about the faulty system. Therefore, corresponding fault
models have to be known.
2.3. Diagnostic algorithms. In fault diagnosis, the sensor measurement Y is compared with the
analytically computed value bY . Therefore, the consistency of the system with the model can be
tested at every time t by forming the residual
r(t) = y(t)  by(t)
In the faultless case, the residual is close to zero. In general, it is not exactly zero due to measure-
ment noise and model uncertainties. If any fault exists, the residual has some specic, non-vanishing
value.
As pointed out by Blanke et al. [8], diagnostic algorithms for continuous-variable systems generally
consist of two components, see also Figure 5:
 Residual generation: The system model and the I/O pair are used to determine residuals
which describe the degree of consistency between the system and the model behaviour.
 Residual evaluation: The residual is evaluated in order to detect, isolate and identify
faults.
 
 
 
 
Residual Generator 
Residual Evaluation 
Measured input Measured output
Residual signals
Assumption about faulty 
components
Figure 5. Residual generation and evaluation are necessary components of diag-
nostic algorithms.
2.4. Re-design. The second step towards a fault-tolerant system involves re-design, which consi-
ders the problem of changing the system structure after a fault has occurred. The aim is to make
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the system able to serve its purpose after the occurrence of a fault. Two principal ways of re-design
have to be distinguished:
 Fault accommodation (o-line solution): Fault accommodation means to adapt the pa-
rameters to the dynamical properties of the faulty system. The input and output of the
system remain the same as for the faultless case. Fault accommodation is based on prede-
signed systems, each of which has been selected o-line for a specic fault. This method is
fast and can meet strong real-time constraints. However, re-design has to be made for all
possible faults before the system is operative.
 Reconguration (on-line solution): If fault accommodation is impossible, the complete
system has to be recongured. In this case a new system conguration is obtained, where
alternative input and output signals are used. Reconguration is necessary in case of sensor
failure.
Although re-design is an important part of a fault-tolerant decision support system this part will
not be considered in the present paper.
2.5. The particular system model. In the preceding, basic terms of fault diagnosis were intro-
duced, where the importance of system models has been reected. In this sub-section, the particular
system model, which will be analysed with data later, is documented. In Lajic [15], system mo-
dels have been derived both for the time domain and the frequency domain. The focus herein is,
however, on the frequency domain model only.
The responses of a ship in an irregular (long-crested) seaway can be deduced by the characteristic
wave energy spectrum S(!) and the ship's transfer functions (!), where ! is the wave frequency.
In this way, the ship responses can be described by response spectra [28], where the spectral densities
are equal to the product of the spectral density of the waves and the square of the transfer functions.
Therefore, in the case of long-crested waves, it follows that the response spectra of, say, heave, z,
pitch, , roll, ' and vertical acceleration, a, amidships are:
c1 : Sz(!e) = 
2
z(!e)S(!e) (1)
c2 : S(!e) = 
2
(!e)S(!e) (2)
c3 : S'(!e) = 
2
'(!e)S(!e) (3)
c4 : Sa(!e) = 
2
a(!e)S(!e) (4)
which will be the constraints, ci, of the system model.
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In Eqs. (1)-(4), the encounter frequency !e has been introduced, since the response spectra are
derived from sensor measurements onboard the ship. The relationship between the encountered
frequency and the true wave frequency is governed by the Doppler shift
!e = !   !2A , A = U
g
cos (5)
for the relative wave heading  and speed U ; g is the acceleration of gravity. The transfer functions
of a ship are measures of the ship's seakeeping performance. Typically, the transfer functions are
obtained by linear frequency domain strip theory, three-dimensional panel codes, or by measure-
ments.
In addition to the constraints, c1; : : : c4, the following transforms, ti, and measurements, mi, are
introduced:
t1 : Sz(!e) = F(z) (6)
t2 : S(!e) = F() (7)
t3 : S'(!e) = F(') (8)
t4 : Sa(!e) = F(a) (9)
m1 : y1 = z (10)
m2 : y2 =  (11)
m3 : y3 = ' (12)
m4 : y4 = a (13)
In the present case, the symbol F( ) denotes a transform operator which transforms from time
domain to the frequency domain. It could for example be the Fast Fourier transform (FFT).
For the studied system model - dealing generally with wave-ship interactions - it seems relevant to
make a couple of notes about the implication of (particularly) rough sea conditions. Firstly, this
paper is intended to illustrate initial ideas developed for fault-tolerant decision support systems
and it is therefore considered to be of less importance how accurately the hydrodynamic behaviour
of a ship is calculated. For this reason, all data and results studied later are derived on the basis
of transfer functions (obtained by the 3D panel code Wasim [9]) without going into details about
accuracy. However, it is clear that for rough wave conditions, the use of transfer functions can
generally lead to unreliable results due to the inherent linear assumption, which is often violated
in rough sea conditions. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the suggested system model
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- based on frequency domain theory, facilitating the use of transfer functions - can be extended
to include also time domain theory, see [15], without introducing a linear assumption between the
wave-ship interactions. As a second note, it is worth to point out that during rough sea conditions,
fault detection is particularly useful, since any system sensor may observe continuous structural
vibrations. Thus, fault detection (and tolerance) is fundamental to secure a system's performance
also in the event of degrading sensors due to unintended vibrations. However, the inuence of the
structural vibrations could/should be limited by a proper installation of the sensors.
3. System analysis
3.1. Introduction. In order to have a fault-tolerant onboard decision support system, fault diag-
nosis is a crucial element. Therefore, already at an early design stage it is important to secure
that it is possible to detect and isolate faults. The usual way to do this is to apply structural
analysis (which should not be confused with the twin term within the elds of mechanical and civil
engineering). In this section the structure of the studied (dynamical) system will be investigated.
By applying structural analysis, it is possible to obtain answers regarding fault diagnosis without
detailed calculations, e.g. the ability to detect the fault or recover after the fault. Structural analy-
sis can be performed from the early design stages where detailed modelling has not yet been made.
For sensor fault detection, there is a need to nd physical relations between measured values. There
is no need to express those physical relations explicitly. Rather, the structure of the constraints,
that is the existence of relations between variables and parameters, is considered only.
Example. Basically, structural analysis investigates the links which exists between variables and
parameters, independently on the form of the underlying equations [8]. Often, structural analysis
is therefore performed by use of graph theory, where a bi-partite graph and an associated incidence
matrix represents a "qualitative, very low-level, easy to obtain, model of the system behaviour",
Blanke et al. [8]. This can be illustrated by a small-scale example, where a system described by
the following equation is studied:
PB = 2Qn;
PB is the brake power of an engine, Q is the brake torque, and n is the revolutions per second. The
equation can be transformed into the following form:
c1 : PB   2Qn = 0
FAULT TOLERANT DSS ON SHIPS 12
which means that the constraint c1 relates three variables (PB ; Q; n). Furthermore, the brake power
is measured by a sensor whose output is y1, and the revolutions per second n by a sensor whose
output is y2. This means that the previous system obeys the expressions:
c1 : PB   2Qn = 0
m1 : y1   PB = 0
m2 : y2   n = 0
The known variables are y1 and y2 only, because they are the measured sensor outputs. All other
variables are unknown. The relations in the system can be summarised as follows:
c1 relates PB , Q and n
m1 relates PB and y1
m2 relates n and y2
In the early design phase of a fault-tolerant system, these relations are the only concern. The
structure of the system is presented at the right-hand side in Figure 6 (the incidence matrix),
where rows represent the set of constraints and columns the set of variables. If a particular variable
is a member of a particular constraint, '1' will be written in the cell, and if not the cell will be
empty. Another way of representing the relations in the system is to use the graph shown at the
left-hand side in Figure 6. It is worth noting that both the table and the graph give the same
information about the system.
By inspection of the incidence matrix (or the bi-partite), it can be concluded that all the unknown
variables in the system can be computed, since PB can be computed from y1 by using the measu-
rement equation m1 (this is denoted by the bold red 1), n can be computed from y2 by using the
measurement equation m2 and therefore Q can be computed from the constraint c1. However, there
is no need to calculate all the variables. The important thing is to see if it is possible to compute
all variables and if there are some equations which have not been used for computing variables.
P Q n
c1 m1 m2
B
y 1 y 2
% y1 y2 PB Q n
c1 1 1 1
m1 1 1
m2 1 1
Figure 6. System structure; bi-partite graph (left) and incidence matrix (right).
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The latter equations will be used for extracting the residuals. In the presence of a fault, the system
components no longer satisfy the equations which are dened for their normal behaviour. Therefore,
structural analysis can give the possibility of detecting faults. A fault-detection procedure will be
presented in Section 5, where the residuals will be evaluated.
Onboard systems. Most onboard systems are very complex and therefore there is a need for
having a tool to cope with the complexity of the systems. Structural analysis based on graph
theory is a unique design methodology that can cope with the diagnosis design for systems of high
complexity and also be used for analysis of the cases of cascaded or multiple faults, cf. Blanke [5].
From a bi-partite graph, it is possible to obtain information about the relations between variables,
but it is not possible to obtain information about the appearance of the constraints. If two systems
have the same bi-partite graph, those systems are structurally equivalent. It is noteworthy that
systems, which have the same structure but only dier by the values of their parameters, are still
structurally equivalent. If a fault is considered as a violation of a constraint, it is obvious that
for fault diagnosis, the structure is of essential concern. The values of system parameters do not
inuence the ability to detect or isolate a fault in structural analysis, but parameters can have
values such that structural detectability does not imply analytical detectability.
In structural analysis, it is convenient to separate the set of system variables into unknown (X) and
known (K) sets. In the case of onboard decision support systems, known variables are measured
ship responses, e.g. pitch, heave, roll motion, etc. On the other hand, unknown variables are not
measured but should instead be computed. In the case of onboard systems, unknown variables
include for example the wave spectrum. The wave spectrum is not measured directly; instead it
can be calculated/estimated by a procedure that has as input a set of measured ship responses.
Like the system variables, the constraints can also be divided into the set CX (unknown) and
CK (known). The set CK contains constraints which relate known variables only, and the set CX
contains constraints which relate at least one unknown variable. In order to extract the residuals
available for fault diagnosis, structural analysis of the constraints and the unknown variables may
be applied. While there are several ways to deduct analytical redundancy relations, structural
analysis is particularly simple; the details are explained in Lajic [15].
3.2. The frequency domain model. In the following, the frequency domain model of an onboard
decision support system is considered. The constraints of the model were derived previously (Eqs.
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1 to 4) but can be rewritten in a form which is more convenient for the system analysis:
c1 :
Sz(!e)
2z(!e)
= S(!e) (14)
c2 :
S(!e)
2(!e)
= S(!e) (15)
c3 :
S'(!e)
2'(!e)
= S(!e) (16)
c4 :
Sa(!e)
2a(!e)
= S(!e) (17)
The transforms, t1; : : : ; t4, and measurements, m1; : : : ;m4, are given by Eqs. (6)-(9) and Eqs.
(10)-(13), respectively.
A bi-partite graph of the system is shown in Figure 7. The system variables are represented by
circles and the system constraints by bars. The graph is based on the system equations and it
provides an overview of the system. Using the graph, it is possible to see which constraints describe
a particular variable. It is interesting to note that the variable S (the wave energy spectrum)
is connected with four constraints c1; c2; c3; c4. In the following, it will be shown that S is not
a member of any residual and it will not be calculated (directly). The residuals should contain
only known variables, i.e. sensor measurements. The wave spectrum S will be matched from the
constraint c1. For fault diagnosis, only the residuals are of interest. The set of variables in the
system is separated into the sets K (known) and X (unknown):
K = fy1; y2; y3; y4g ,
m
1 t1
y
1 z Sz
t
2
m
2
S  y2
c
1 c2
S!
c
3
c
4
m
3
t
3
y
3 " S"
t
4
m
4
Sa a y4
Figure 7. Bi-partite graph of an onboard system.
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X = fz; ; '; a; Sz; S; S'; Sa; Sg
The constraints depend on the transfer functions of the ship. However, the transfer functions are
known functions, since they can be calculated in advance, and they will therefore be considered as
system parameters.
The constraints are matched to the unknown variables, i.e. the ship responses, as follows:
m1(y1)! z (18)
m2(y2)!  (19)
m3(y3)! ' (20)
m4(y4)! a (21)
where the standard notation, indicated by the arrow (!), is used to saying that the variable on
the right-hand side is obtained (matched) from a given measurement mi that depends on a specic
variable.
Previously, the response spectra (of the ship responses) have been matched from the transforms
t1 : : : t4, cf. Eqs. (6)-(9). On the other hand, the ship responses have already been matched from
the measurement equations which means that the following expressions can be derived:
t1(z) = t1(m1(y1))! Sz (22)
t2() = t2(m2(y2))! S (23)
t3(') = t3(m3(y3))! S' (24)
t4(a) = t4(m2(y4))! Sa (25)
c1(Sz) = c1(t1(m1(y1)))! S (26)
Thus, it is possible to attain a complete matching of the unknown variables. However, three
constraints remain unmatched. Each of these forms the basis of a residual generator that can check
the consistency of the constraints. The residual r1 is given by
r1 : c2 [S ; S]! 0;
and after substitution of the unknown variables, obtained by backtracking through the matching:
r1 : c2 [c1 (t1(m1(y1))) ; t2 (m2(y2))]! 0 (27)
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Table 1. Incidence matrix.
% c1 c2 c3 c4 t1 t2 t3 t4 m1 m2 m3 m4
y1 1 1 1 1 1 1
y2 1 1 1
y3 1 1 1
y4 1 1 1
z 1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1
' 1 1 1
a 1 1 1
Sz 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1
S' 1 1
Sa 1 1
S 1 1 1 1
! 0 ! 0 ! 0
The residual r2 is given by
r2 : c3 [S ; S']! 0;
and after substitution
r2 : c3 [c1 (t1(m1(y1))) ; t3 (m3(y3))]! 0 (28)
Finally, the residual r3 follows from
r3 : c4 [S ; Sa]! 0; or
r3 : c4 [c1 (t1(m1(y1))) ; t4 (m4(y4))]! 0 (29)
The incidence matrix and the matching are shown in Table 1. Unmatched constraints are denoted
by "! 0". It is easily noted that three constraints are unmatched and that they are the basis of
the residual generation. The oriented graph of the system is shown in the upper part of Figure 8.
The output of the unmatched constraints is labelled zero and they are the (three) system residuals.
From the oriented graph, it is noted that in order to match S , z should rst be matched from the
known variable y1 and the measurement equation m1; Sz from the transform t1 and, nally, S
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Figure 8. Oriented graph (top), in which the arrows indicate the order of mat-
ching, and dependency matrix (bottom) of the residuals.
from the constraint c1. The dependency matrix of the three residuals is shown in the lower part
of Figure 8. It should be noted that transforms t1 : : : t4 are omitted from the dependency matrix,
because these transforms are based on a mathematical denition and it cannot fail.
The residuals can be expressed in analytical form as
r1 :
fF(y1)g (!e)
2z(!e)
  fF(y2)g (!e)
2(!e)
= 0 (30)
r2 :
fF(y1)g (!e)
2z(!e)
  fF(y3)g (!e)
2'(!e)
= 0 (31)
r3 :
fF(y1)g (!e)
2z(!e)
  fF(y4)g (!e)
2a(!e)
= 0 (32)
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Table 2. Dependency matrix.
% c1 c2 c3 c4 m1 m2 m3 m4
r4 1 1 1
r5 1 1 1
r6 1 1 1
i i i i i i
Isolability can be enhanced, however, by creating residuals that are derived from the original three.
A combination of these residuals could also be used as residual generators and, by linear combina-
tion, the following holds,
r4 :
fF(y2)g (!e)
2(!e)
  fF(y3)g (!e)
2'(!e)
= 0 (33)
r5 :
fF(y2)g (!e)
2(!e)
  fF(y4)g (!e)
2a(!e)
= 0 (34)
r6 :
fF(y3)g (!e)
2'(!e)
  fF(y4)g (!e)
2a(!e)
= 0 (35)
The dependency matrix for the modied residuals is shown in Table 2. From the table, the following
information about the variables can be obtained by combining residuals r1 to r6 in the analysis:
Detectable: c1, m1
Undetectable: none
Isolable: c2, c3, c4, m2, m3, m4
In decision support systems, it is the statistical values of to-be-expected future responses that are
of concern. The statistical value could for example be the variance which can be derived from the
0th-order moment dened by
m0 =
Z 1
0
SR(!)d!
where SR(!) is the response spectrum (of any considered response). An analogy can be made to the
residuals and therefore it is sucient to consider integrated versions of Eqs. (30)-(35). Integration
over the entire frequency range [!e;min; !e;max] leads to the following residuals which will be used
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as the nal versions for fault detection:
r1 =
Z fF(y1)g (!e)
2z(!e)
  fF(y2)g (!e)
2(!e)

d!e (36)
r2 =
Z fF(y1)g (!e)
2z(!e)
  fF(y3)g (!e)
2'(!e)

d!e (37)
r3 =
Z fF(y1)g (!e)
2z(!e)
  fF(y4)g (!e)
2a(!e)

d!e (38)
And, the auxiliary residuals are,
r4 =
Z fF(y2)g (!e)
2(!e)
  fF(y3)g (!e)
2'(!e)

d!e (39)
r5 =
Z fF(y2)g (!e)
2(!e)
  fF(y4)g (!e)
2a(!e)

d!e (40)
r6 =
Z fF(y3)g (!e)
2'(!e)
  fF(y4)g (!e)
2a(!e)

d!e (41)
4. Change detection algorithms
4.1. Introduction. In order to recognise the occurrence of a fault, a tool must be provided for
real-time fault detection. This can be achieved by applying a detector as part of the residual
evaluation. Thus, the detector will inform in real-time to the onboard system that the residuals
have changed (when a fault has occurred).
This section has been included to give only the most basics on change detectors; the more complete
description is given in Lajic [15].
4.2. Change detectors. Sequential change detection algorithms, or sequential detectors, are the
most common tools for detecting changes in a stochastic system. In principle, two groups of
detectors can be distinguished, i.e. detectors for multiplicative faults and detectors for additive
faults. The detectors for multiplicative faults are based on residual variance change detection
[14], e.g. energy detectors, and, on the other hand, the detectors for additive faults are based on
residual mean change detection, e.g. GLR (generalised likelihood ratio algorithm) [2] or CUSUM
(cumulative sum algorithm) [25]. All these detectors use the Neyman-Pearson approach, cf. Kay
[14]. According to the Neyman-Pearson approach the value of a likelihood ratio distinguishes
between two hypotheses, i.e. the hypothesis that the fault is not present and the hypothesis that
the fault is present.
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Figure 9. Residual in the presence of a multiplicative fault between 100 s and 500
s and GLR test (decision function and alarm). Lajic [15]
4.3. Decision function. Basically, change detectors are developed from assumptions about the
probabilistic behaviour of the residual(s) and, mathematically speaking, the aim of a detector is to
map a residual into a decision. In the Neyman-Pearson approach the mapping is controlled by a
decision function together with a threshold value that must not be exceeded if the signal (residual)
should be considered as non-faulty. In addition to the decision function itself, the determination of
an appropriate threshold value becomes a central element for change detection. Means to decide
on the threshold value have been discussed by, e.g., Galeazzi et al. [11]. An example of a decision
function g based on the GLR test is shown in Figure 9 for an arbitrary residual and an associated
alarm function; further details can be found in [15].
5. Fault detection and isolation
5.1. Introduction. Onboard decision support systems rely fundamentally on receiving an estimate
of the sea state, or the wave spectrum, as an input for the prediction of relevant/critical response
values. One way to obtain an estimate of the - on-site - wave spectrum is to process a set of three
measured ship responses by use of the wave buoy analogy, e.g. Nielsen [20, 21]. Typically, several
responses are monitored on ships and it is therefore a matter of selecting a specic combination of
these to be processed by the wave buoy analogy. Clearly, it is absolutely vital that faulty signals
should be discarded from the procedure for sea state estimation if it is possible, if not, the fault
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Table 3. Main dimensions of the considered ship.
Length, Lpp 275.0 m
Breadth, Bmld 40.0 m
Draught, T 12.0 m
should be estimated. In this way, fault detection and isolation are remedies towards increased
dependability and reliability of shipboard monitoring and decision support systems.
The present section serves to illustrate the derived models and the associated fault diagnosis tech-
niques, when real data is analysed. Results will be given for a container ship, where focus is on
full-scale motion measurements. For illustrative reasons, faults have been imposed articially and,
specically, multiplicative faults are studied. It is noteworthy that other types of faults have been
studied; results are given by Lajic [15].
5.2. Ship responses and imposed faults. The motion measurements have been obtained from
a container ship with main dimensions as given by Table 3. In the analysis four motion components
are considered; the sway motion, the heave motion, the pitch motion and the vertical acceleration
at the centre of gravity. Although the interest in this study does not directly concern sea state
estimation, it should be noted that all of the four motion components can be used as candidates
for the wave buoy analogy [24]. Time histories of the motion components are shown in Figure 10.
As examples of fault scenarios, faults will be created by introducing multiplicative faults fi =
kiyi (ki = 5; i = 1; : : : 4) to the individual motion components i. The faults are introduced during
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Figure 10. Measured time histories.
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Table 4. Fault signatures: f1 is a fault on the heave sensor, f2 is a fault on
the pitch sensor, f3 is a fault on the sway sensor, f4 is a fault on the vertical
acceleration sensor. The residuals r1-r6 are dened by Eqs. (36)-(41).
% f1 f2 f3 f4
r1 1 1
r2 1 1
r3 1 1
r4 1 1
r5 1 1
r6 1 1
i i i i
the time interval between 600 s and 1300 s. In Figure 11 the ship responses in the presence of the
multiplicative faults are shown. The value of the factor ki is for illustrative reasons chosen relatively
large; the procedures have been tested and are well-working also for smaller values.
The fault signatures are shown in Table 4. All four column vectors are dierent from zero and have
a unique signature, which means that all the faults are isolable. From the dependency matrix of
the residuals r1, r2 and r3 (cf. Figure 8), it is seen that violation of each constraint is isolable,
except constraints c1 and m1. The fault f1 is isolable but from a theoretical point of view, it is not
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Figure 11. Ship responses with multiplicative faults between 600 s and 1300 s.
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possible to distinguish if c1 or m1 is violated. From a practical point of view there is no dierence;
it is only important that all the faults can be isolated.
5.3. Residual evaluation. The direct calculation of the residuals, Eqs. (36)-(41), leads to dividing
a response spectrum by the square of a corresponding transfer function. However, this division will,
in general, cause numerical problems, since the transfer function(s) can have values equal to zero
(or close to) for certain frequencies. Therefore, it will be more reliable to estimate the values of the
residuals instead of calculating them directly. In the following, the residual evaluation is carried
out by an approach that has some resemblance to the wave buoy analogy [20, 21], although the
present procedure is developed to be more simple because the residual evaluation must be carried
out continuously in real-time.
On the basis of Eqs. (36)-(41), the residuals are written in a general form as:
ri =
Z "fF(yj)g (!e)
2j(!e)
#
d!e  
Z fF(yk)g (!e)
2k(!e)

d!e; j; k = 1; : : : 4; j 6= k; i = 1; : : : 6 (42)
Moreover, the signicant wave height is introduced from the calculation of the 0-th order spectral
moment of the wave energy spectrum:
Hs = 4
p
m0 (43)
m0 =
Z 1
0
S(!e)d!e (44)
Thus, from the four constraints, c1; : : : c4, and Eq. (43), the following expression can be obtainedZ "fF(yj)g (!e)
2j (!e)
#
d!e =

Hs;j
4
2
(45)
where Hs;j is the signicant wave height that may be associated to the process which governs the
signal yj . Similarly, the signal yk can be used to establish the identical expression for the k-th
process: Z fF(yk)g (!e)
2k(!e)

d!e =

Hs;k
4
2
(46)
In this way, the problem of the residual calculation becomes a problem of estimating the signicant
wave height by use of dierent signals:
ri =

Hs;j
4
2
 

Hs;k
4
2
; j; k = 1; : : : 4; j 6= k; i = 1; : : : 6 (47)
Consequently, the approach for fault detection and isolation becomes itself a matter of sea state
estimation. However, to simplify and to avoid numerical problems, some elementary assumptions
will be made. First of all, a (uni-modal) parameterised wave spectrum is introduced to describe
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the wave energy distribution as function of (wave) frequency !. Herein, the Pierson-Moskowitz
spectrum is considered [13]:
SPM (!) = 4
3H2sTz(!Tz)
 5e 
3(!Tz=2)
 4
(48)
where Tz is the zero-crossing period. Two other assumptions are imposed, so that (1) only long-
crested waves are considered, and (2) the wave direction is taken to be identical to the wind
direction. All together, the residual evaluation has been transformed into an optimisation problem
in the variables Hs and Tz. The cost function is established somewhat arbitrarily by comparing,
frequency-wise, calculated and measured values of a given response spectrum and integrating. The
cost function takes the form
Fi 
Z 1
0

SPM (!)
2
i (!)
 d!d!e
  Si(!e)2 d!e (49)
where Si is the response spectrum obtained from the signal yi. This means that an optimised set
of parameters (Hs; Tz) is determined from each of the considered sensor signals, and from this set
the signicant wave height is applied to Eq. (47).
5.4. Results and discussion. Multiplicative faults, fi = kiyi (ki = 5; i = 1; : : : 4), have been
imposed to all sensor signals, and an example of the behaviour of one of the residuals formed by
Eq. (47) is given in Figure 12. In the plots, the residual r3 is shown in a non-faulty case (upper
plot) and in the presence of faults on the heave (middle plot) and the acceleration (lower plot)
sensors. The sensitivity of r3 to a fault, being it on one or the other sensor, is clearly seen. The
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Figure 12. Residual r3 in non-faulty and faulty cases.
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other residuals, r1; r2; r4; r5; r6, behave very similar and, although not shown, the plots, made like
those in Figure 12, exhibit an identical sensitivity to the imposed faults, cf. Lajic [15].
In the case of residual evaluation in the presence of a multiplicative fault, it is common to use
detectors for change in the variance of the residual [14, 15]. However, in the present work the
residuals have been obtained by an optimisation procedure from the measured signals. Therefore,
even in the case of a multiplicative fault, the presence of a fault will be reected as a change in
the mean value of the residual. For this reason the residuals are evaluated by a scalar GLR test
[15]. The alarm diagram is constructed using a decision function and an appropriate threshold.
The value of the threshold has been selected using an empirical method outlined by Galeazzi et al.
[11]. In this approach the threshold value should be determined on the basis of healthy and faulty
data. A computation of the decision function based on a set of healthy data makes it possible to
determine the typical range of values of this function in the absence of fault, and to set the threshold
in such a way that false alarms are avoided [8], which is absolutely fundamental for the end-users
to have trust in any developed system. Details of the applied empirical method is found in Lajic
[15].
The results of the GLR test (decision function and alarm) for the residual r1 are shown in Figure
13. It is easily seen that the system is in an alarm condition in the time interval between 600
seconds and 1300 seconds, which is the interval of the presence of the fault. In Figures 14-18 the
results of the GLR test for the other residuals are given. It is seen that the GLR test is able to
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Figure 13. Residual r1 in faulty cases for heave (left) and pitch (right). GLR test
results - decision function and alarm.
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detect the presence of the faults in all the residuals. In general, it is observed that the GLR test
turns the alarm on and o instantaneously, at the initiation of the fault and at the end, although
a small delay in the detection is noticed by close inspection. However, in practice, it is typically
a valid assumption to consider the sea state as changing slowly. Thus, the sea state is assumed to
remain essentially constant for periods of the order of 20 to 30 minutes at least. Consequently, a
small delay in the alarm is not critical for this kind of onboard systems.
 
"
# $  %&$ # '(  
"
# $  %&$ # '(
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
-40
-20
0
20
40
r 2
 [
m
2
]
r
2
 (multiplicative fault - heave sensor)
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
10
20
GLR test (decision function)
g
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
0.5
1
GLR test (alarm)
Time [s]
A
la
rm
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
-40
-20
0
20
40
r 2
 [
m
2
]
r
2
(multiplicative fault - sway sensor)
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
10
20
GLR test (decision function)
g
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
0.5
1
GLR test (alarm)
Time [s]
A
la
rm
Figure 14. Residual r2 in faulty cases for heave (left) and pitch (right). GLR test
results - decision function and alarm.
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Figure 15. Residual r3 in faulty cases for heave (left) and pitch (right). GLR test
results - decision function and alarm.
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Figure 16. Residual r4 in faulty cases for heave (left) and pitch (right). GLR test
results - decision function and alarm.
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Figure 17. Residual r5 in faulty cases for heave (left) and pitch (right). GLR test
results - decision function and alarm.
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Figure 18. Residual r6 in faulty cases for heave (left) and pitch (right). GLR test
results - decision function and alarm.
6. Summary and conclusions
In the present work, ideas and approaches to increase the reliability and dependability of monitoring
and decision support systems have been developed. In this context, matters of ship safety are the
main concern for the studied systems. Specically, fault diagnosis techniques have been considered
for onboard systems aiming at operator guidance with respect to course and speed of the vessel.
Decision support systems needs an estimate of the on-site sea state as a fundamental input. In case
sea state estimation is conducted by the wave buoy analogy [20, 21] the best solution is to use three
dierent ship responses and usually several responses are available on today's commercial and naval
vessels. However, faulty signals should be discarded from the procedure for sea state estimation if
it is possible, if not the fault should be estimated.
In the article a specic and novel model for fault diagnosis have been discussed. The new numerical
procedure is derived in the frequency domain and relies on linear spectral analysis. In this way,
it is possible to dene equations which correlate dierent ship responses through corresponding
transfer functions. The model was tested using full-scale motion measurements from a container
ship, where the data was analysed as a post-voyage process. The following points can be associated
to the outcome of the test:
 Multiplicative faults were added articially to the motion measurements and the sensitivity
of the residuals to the sensor fault was investigated.
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 The residuals were based on wave height estimation and were evaluated by the GLR test.
 All the imposed faults were detected and isolated.
Fault detection and isolation are very important elements in the design of fault-tolerant decision
support systems and this study has outlined remedies that can be applied for this purpose, when
the ship responses are assumed to be linear in the wave excitation. In case of a non-linear model,
Lajic [15] should be consulted and [15] also discusses the possibility to use Volterra theory for
transforming a non-linear time domain model into a frequency domain model without linearisation.
6.1. Future work. In the future, the frequency domain model should be made even more robust.
In particular, it would be of interest to consider the behaviour to faults imposed as (slow) drifts
in signals, since this is a dicult but highly relevant problem. Moreover, it should be considered
to relax on the crude assumptions imposed in the sea state estimation carried out as part of the
residual evaluation. This includes, among others, the introduction of more realistic bi-modal wave
spectra, and to consider scenarios where the wave direction is not necessarily equal to the wind
direction.
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